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SHALL DOES NOT MEAN SHALL IN SHORT V. SHORT 
Taheera Sabreen Randolph∗ 
I. BACKGROUND 
The case of Short v. Short1 is the first reported decision 
regarding an award of interim spousal support since the enactment 
of Louisiana Revised Statute 9:3262 in 2009. The statute mandates 
certain documentation be provided by both parties in a full 
evidentiary hearing on the determination of income for spousal 
support.3 A key issue in the case was whether a claimant spouse 
who fails to comply with the mandatory provisions in the statute, 
as a consequence, fails to prove entitlement to interim spousal 
support.4 
On remand from the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal 
due to the district court’s lack of a full evidentiary hearing on the 
matter in the first instance,5 the district court determined that 
Pamela Short was entitled to interim spousal support from her 
husband, David Short, from the time Mr. Short left the family 
home in April 2006 until the extinguishment of the obligation on 
      ∗   J.D./D.C.L. Candidate, May 2014, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, 
Louisiana State University. The author would like to thank Professor Elizabeth 
R. Carter for her guidance throughout the writing of this case note. 
 1. Short v. Short, 11-1084 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/22/12), 96 So. 3d 552. 
 2. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:326 (2013 supp.).  
 3. See ROBERT C. LOWE, 1 LOUISIANA PRACTICE DIVORCE § 8:150 (2013 
ed.). The author points out the new requirements concerning evidence of income 
for spousal support apply to both interim and final spousal support. 
 4. Short, 96 So. 3d at 557. (A claimant has the burden of proving his or her 
need to spousal support by proving a lack of sufficient income or the ability to 
earn a sufficient income to maintain the standard of living comparable to that 
enjoyed by the parties during their marriage.) 
 5. Short v. Short, 33 So. 3d 988, 995. The case was remanded because the 
district court did not allow both parties to introduce certain evidence before 
awarding interim spousal support. Although a district court has the discretion to 
award interim spousal support, it has a statutory duty imposed by Louisiana 
Civil Code art. 113 to consider the needs of the claimant spouse, the ability of 
the other spouse to pay and the standard of living the parties enjoyed during the 
marriage, which is accomplished by a full evidentiary hearing on the matter. 
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March 27, 2008.6 As evidence of her need, Ms. Short submitted 
only a copy of an income and expense form that indicated her 
expenses severely outweighed her income. However, she admitted 
that the amounts were mere estimates, and also relied on 
documentation submitted by Mr. Short regarding the family 
expenses during the marriage.7 During the evidentiary hearing, Mr. 
Short argued that the court should consider Ms. Short’s entire 
financial situation, which included additional income from 
personal injury settlements and loans from her family.8 The district 
court disagreed with Mr. Short and stated that the amount of 
interim spousal support is not to be reduced or offset using the 
separate assets of either spouse because there is a statutory duty9 
for each spouse to support each other during marriage.10 Adopting 
the figures submitted by Ms. Short on her income and expense 
form as a means of calculating her net monthly income (although 
unsupported by any documentation, as required under Louisiana 
Revised Statute 9:326), the district court stated that the expenses 
she enumerated were reasonable and not excessive.11 The district 
court ultimately held the amount of $44,968.71 as an appropriate 
total for the relevant time period, asserting that Ms. Short proved 
sufficient need for interim spousal support.12 
 
 
 6. Id. The extinguishment of the obligation was due to the judicial 
determination that Ms. Short’s admitted cohabitation with another man was 
sufficient grounds to grant a divorce to Mr. Short. 
 7. Short, 96 So. 3d at 557. 
 8. Id. at 555. (In his brief to the appellate court, Mr. Short pointed to prior 
jurisprudence that held that a claimant spouse’s entire financial circumstances 
must be considered, including all sources of income from which the claimant’s 
expenses can be met, in determining a claimant’s need for interim spousal 
support.) 
 9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 98. 
 10. Short, 96 So. 3d at 555. 
 11. Id. at 557. 
 12. Id. 
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II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
On a subsequent appeal to the Louisiana Fifth Circuit, Mr. 
Short’s foremost argument was that the district court erred in its 
judgment because Ms. Short13 failed to comply with mandates 
prescribed in Louisiana Revised Statute 9:326 regarding evidence 
required to be submitted to a court in order to correctly calculate 
income in the determination of an award for interim spousal 
support.14 Ms. Short responded that her failure to comply with the 
statute was due to her inability to earn the requisite amount of 
income necessary to file a 2006 and 2007 tax return during their 
separation and, furthermore, that at the time of their separation she 
was a full-time stay-at-home mom.15 The Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeal upheld the district court’s award of interim spousal 
support, despite Ms. Short’s failure to comply with the mandates in 
the statute.16 The court began its analysis with provisions from the 
Louisiana Civil Code, noting that a trial court has significant 
discretion17 to award interim spousal support based on the needs of 
the claimant, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the 
 13. Id. at 554. At the time of this appeal, Ms. Short reverted back to her 
maiden name Marinovich which the court used throughout the opinion. 
However, for the purposes of this analysis, the author will continue to use Ms. 
Short out of mere convenience and for lack of confusion.  
 14. Id. at 556. In his original brief to the appellate court, Mr. Short 
contended that the evidence required under the statute is for the purposes of 
corroborating statements of income made to the court by each party. He 
contended that Ms. Short did not meet the burden of proving her need because 
she did not comply with the statute. 
 15. Id. at 558. Mr. Short noted in his original brief to the appellate court that 
Ms. Short admitted in the evidentiary proceeding to being self-employed as a 
calligrapher of wedding invitations and working at St. Tammany Parish Hospital 
in 2007. He argued that Ms. Short should be required to produce paycheck stubs 
from the hospital to corroborate her income and she should also be mandated to 
produce the documentation required by the IRS used to determine if she owed 
self-employment tax.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 556 (citing Lambert v. Lambert, 960 So.2d 921, 928 that the 
standard of review is an abuse of discretion and the district court’s conclusion 
will only be reversed if there is a reasonable factual basis in the record for doing 
so and the finding in the record is clearly or manifestly erroneous. 
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standard of living of both spouses during the marriage.18 The court 
reiterated that a spouse’s right to claim spousal support is grounded 
in the statutorily imposed duty that spouses are to support each 
other during marriage,19 and that the definitive purpose behind a 
judgment of interim spousal support is to assist the claimant in 
maintaining the status quo and sustaining the lifestyle enjoyed by 
both spouses during the marriage while the divorce litigation is 
pending.20 
The court cited the pertinent portion of Louisiana Revised 
Statute 9:326(A), outlining the mandates therein, yet apparently 
accepting Ms. Short’s assertion that she was unable to produce tax 
returns for 2006 and 2007 because she did not earn enough money 
so as to require her to file.21 The court subsequently upheld the 
district court’s adoption of the estimated figures from Ms. Short’s 
expense list, and did not address whether the separate assets of the 
spouses should be assessed in order to reduce or offset any spousal 
support judgment; nor did the court address the implications of the 
failure on the part of Ms. Short to comply with the mandates in the 
statute, even after she admitted to having been employed during 
the time in which she was awarded interim spousal support.22 The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal ultimately found no abuse of 
discretion in the judgment of the district court, and upheld the 
award of interim spousal support.23 
III. COMMENTARY 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal adhered to the standard set 
prior to enactment of Louisiana Revised Statute 9:326, and 
reinforced the notion that an abuse of discretion will only be found 
if the record supports the trial court’s conclusions about the means 
 18. LA. CIV. CODE art. 113.  
 19. LA. CIV. CODE art. 98. 
 20. Short, 96 So. 3d at 556.  
 21. Id. at 557. 
 22. Id. at 557-58. 
 23. Id. at 558. 
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of the payor spouse and his ability to pay.24 Besides quoting the 
statute it its opinion, the appellate court made no mention 
regarding how its enactment impacts any analysis of the needs of 
the claimant generally or its impact on Ms. Short’s claim in 
particular. Thus, the legal analysis in Short v. Short did not fully 
take into account the implications of the newly enacted evidentiary 
standards in the statute in determining interim spousal support. 
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:326(A) lays out, in clear and 
unambiguous language,25 the documentation that is required to be 
produced by each party as evidence of income in a court 
proceeding on the determination of spousal support. The statute 
expressly states that both parties “shall provide to the court a 
verified income statement showing gross income and adjusted 
gross income, together with documentation of current and past 
earnings” and provides examples of what constitutes suitable 
documentation.26 The statute uses the word “shall” a total of four 
times in the pertinent part of subsection A, and mandates that each 
party in an evidentiary hearing for spousal support provide the 
court with a verified income statement showing gross and adjusted 
gross income along with documentation of current and past 
earnings.27 The statute also stipulates that both parties shall submit 
their “most recent federal tax return.”28 There is no time restriction 
or constraint in the language of this requirement which leads to the 
reasonable conclusion that Ms. Short had a statutory duty to 
 24. See, e.g., Derouen v. Derouen, 893 So.2d 981, 984 (stating there is no 
abuse of discretion “if the record supports the trial court's conclusions about the 
means of the payor spouse and his or her ability to pay,” and also establishing 
that any award of interim spousal support requires a finding that the expenses 
claimed are reasonable); Lambert, 960 So.2d at 928 (citing Derouen). 
 25. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 9: “When a law is clear and unambiguous and its 
application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as 
written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the 
legislature” (emphasis added). 
 26. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:326(A) (2013 supp.): “Suitable documentation 
of current earnings shall include but not be limited to pay stubs or employer 
statements” (emphasis added).  
 27. Id. (emphasis added). 
 28. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:326(A) (2013 supp.) (emphasis added). 
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produce her most recent tax return, which was in 2005, to serve as 
verification of income from her employment as a part-time nurse 
until August of that year.29 Nowhere in the statute does it state that 
a party is not required to produce his or her most recent tax return 
simply due to a status of voluntary or involuntary unemployment at 
the time of separation.30 Moreover, on its face, it appears Ms. 
Short was statutorily required to produce paycheck stubs from her 
employment with St. Tammany Parish Hospital during 2007, in 
addition to any documentation she provided to the Internal 
Revenue Service regarding her income from her business as a 
calligrapher of wedding invitations.31 
Commentary on the statute provides insight into how a court 
may interpret the mandatory provisions, and points out the fact that 
the language in Subsection A is almost identical to the language in 
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:315.2(A), which lays out the 
evidentiary requirements for calculating child support obligations; 
the latter statute was amended by the same act that enacted 
Revised Statute 9:326.32 An appellate court placed in the Fifth 
Circuit’s position should inquire into the intent behind the 
Louisiana legislature’s enactment of a spousal support statute with 
language almost identical to that of the child support determination 
statute. Furthermore, an inquiry into case precedent that determines 
what happens to a claim for child support when the evidentiary 
requirements under the child support statute are not adhered to 
might also help interpret and apply the spousal support statute. 
 29. Short, 96 So. 3d at 557. 
 30. Ms. Short argued she could not produce any verification of income 
because at the time of separation she had been unemployed for several months 
due to her role as a full-time stay at home mother. Short, 96 So.3d at 558. 
 31. Mr. Short noted in his reply brief to the appellate court that Ms. Short 
admitted to being employed and consequently should have been required to 
provide a copy of her 1099 form from St. Tammany Parish Hospital along with 
any paycheck stubs to corroborate her income. He also noted she did not 
produce any financial documentation from her own business in the form of tax 
documents, business expenses, receipts, customer checks, etc.  
 32. 2009 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 378 (WEST); See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 
13 (laws on the same subject matter should be interpreted in pari materia). 
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Louisiana Revised Statute 9:315.2(A) requires each party to 
provide the identical documentation now required under Louisiana 
Revised Statute 9:326.33 Therefore, any case precedent interpreting 
the child support evidentiary obligations prior to 2009 are relevant 
for the interpretation of the statutory language currently in effect. 
In Drury v. Drury,34 the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals 
vacated a judgment signed by a district court directing a spouse to 
pay child support because the record was devoid of the supporting 
documentation required by Louisiana Revised Statute 9:315.2. The 
court made reference to the essential nature of documentation in 
calculating child support payment obligations, even in the interim 
setting, and to the fact that judgments for child support cannot be 
based on contingencies.35 Moreover, the court recognized the 
inherent requirement of equity in determining child support 
obligations achieved only through the examination of the complete 
financial status of both parties,36 which is directly relevant to Mr. 
Short’s argument regarding the failure of the district court to take 
into account the entirety of Ms. Short’s economic situation and 
sources of income. The First Circuit in Drury held that due to the 
district court’s failure in requiring the parties to submit the 
documentation clearly set out under the statute, the district court 
could not properly apply the appropriate guidelines under the law 
and its judgment could not be affirmed.37 
 33. LA. REV. STAT. ANN §9:315.2(A) (2013 supp.): 
Each party shall provide to the court a verified income statement 
showing gross income and adjusted gross income, together with 
documentation of current and past earnings. . . . Suitable documentation 
of current earnings shall include but not be limited to pay stubs or 
employer statements. The documentation shall include a copy of the 
party's most recent federal tax return. A copy of the statement and 
documentation shall be provided to the other party. (emphasis added)  
The amendment to this statute in 2009 did not change this pertinent language in 
the calculation of basic child support obligations and simply aligned the 
language with that of La. R.S. 9:326(A). 
 34. 835 So. 2d 533, 539 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2002). 
 35. Id. at 538-39. 
 36. Id. at 539. 
 37. Id. “In the instant case, both parties failed to submit verified statements 
as to their respective incomes, documentation of current and past earnings, 
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In Harris v. Harris,38 a husband appealed the amount of child 
support awarded to his wife based on the incorrect calculation of 
his monthly income, which was a combination of his employment 
wages and the rent he received from some of his properties. His 
monthly employment income was calculated based on pay records 
supplied by his employer and his monthly rental income was 
calculated based on a spreadsheet Mr. Harris prepared himself.39 
The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal immediately noted 
that “neither party complied with the mandatory requirement . . . 
that they submit a copy of their most recent tax return”40 and held 
that the record contained insufficient evidence in order to 
determine what the rental income should be and the case was 
remanded for recalculation of Mr. Harris’ monthly rental income.41 
The language under Louisiana Revised Statute 9:326(A) for the 
determination of interim spousal support calls for the exact 
documentation that was required in Drury and Harris in the 
context of child support. Without submission of the requisite 
documentation, the district court’s judgment in Drury could not be 
upheld, nor could the calculation of monthly rental income be 
upheld in Harris. There is no reason to set a different standard for 
the evidence required to calculate a party’s income in spousal 
support determinations when the language of Louisiana Revised 
Statute 9:3269(A) is clear, unambiguous and precisely mimics the 
language for the required documentation under the child support 
statute. Thus, perhaps the intent of the legislature was to make 
spousal support determinations more equitable to both parties. It 
accomplished this by placing a fixed and mandatory evidentiary 
copies of their most recent tax returns, as well as other evidence mandated by 
La. R.S. 9:315.2”. 
 38. 976 So. 2d 347 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2008). 
 39. Id. at 348. 
 40. Id. at 351. 
 41. Id. The court upheld the calculation of his monthly employment income 
because the documentation used to make the calculation were pay records 
provided by his employer.  
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standard on the claimant’s burden to show need, in addition to the 
payor spouse's ability to pay, which constituted the exclusive focus 
in the past. The author is of the opinion that “shall” should mean 
“shall” in Short v. Short. 
 
 
